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INSURANCE ENTITLEMENT IN HUNGARY*
JOHN MICKLEWRIGHT and GYULA NAGY
The single most likely way to leave the unemployment insurance
(UI) register in Hungary is not by getting a job but by running out
of entitlement to benefit. This situation raises two questions.  First,
what are the implications of the cessation of UI for living
standards?  Second, does UI exhaustion have much effect on the
probability of getting a job through increasing incentives to work?
We investigate these issues with a survey of persons exhausting
entitlement to UI in Summer 1995, paying special attention to the
household circumstances of the unemployed and to the probabilities
of claiming and being awarded means-tested assistance benefit.
1. INTRODUCTION
Central and Eastern European governments in the early 1990s introduced
limited-duration Unemployment Insurance (UI) as the primary form of
income support for the unemployed.  Low outflow rates, sometimes
coupled with reductions in benefit entitlement periods, resulted in sharp
reductions in the initially high coverage by UI of the unemployed stock.
By December 1995, the proportion of the registered unemployed receiving
UI was 50 percent in Poland, below 40 percent in Hungary and about 25
percent in Slovakia, compared to figures in all three countries of around 75-
80 percent in December 1991 ( Boeri and Edwards, [1996], chart 3). In
Hungary, the focus of this paper, exhaustion of UI entitlement has become
                                                
* The follow-up survey of UI exhausters used in the paper was financed by the
ILO/Japan Project on Employment Policies in Hungary. We are indebted to Martin
Godfrey, the co-ordinator of the project, for his support. We thank the National
Labour Centre for much assistance with the survey and especially György Lázár and
Zsuzsa Sági. A number of local government officials gave us very useful information
on the social assistance scheme and Pravin Trivedi commented constructively on our
modelling of it.2
so frequent that the most common way for an entrant to the UI register to
leave it is by running out of entitlement to benefit, rather than by getting a
job. Figure 1 shows monthly outflow rates in Hungary from the stock of UI
recipients to jobs and to all other destinations, among which exhaustion of
entitlement overwhelmingly dominates.  On average only about 5 percent
of the stock of UI recipients left the register each month to get a job in
1994-1996, while the total outflow rate was 15-20 percent.  The diagram
also shows the increasing importance of exhaustion – there is a growing
gap between the total outflow rate and the re-employment rate.
This situation raises two questions: (i) what are the implications of the
cessation of UI for living standards of the unemployed, and (ii) do changes
in living standards following exhaustion of UI have much effect on the
probability of getting a job through increasing incentives to work?  These
questions have not been adequately addressed in Central and Eastern
Europe and in attempting to answer them for Hungary we consider two
related aspects of the debate that have seen little attention in existing work
on the region.  First, we analyse the situation of unemployed individuals
within their households.  On the one hand, the household circumstances of
the unemployed are of obvious importance to their living standards; and on
the other, all but the simplest model of job search accords a role in the
determination of behaviour to income other than the unemployed
individual's benefits and his or her prospective wages.  The high incidence
of dual earner households pre-reform and the tradition of generous family
benefits in the region may imply that the household circumstances of the
unemployed matter in Central and Eastern Europe in a way that differs
from elsewhere.
Second, we shed light on the operation of the social assistance scheme
that provides support to a substantial proportion of those exhausting UI
entitlement.  The Hungarian scheme shares some key features with those in
other countries in the region.  It is a crude scheme with a simple per capita
household income test and no tapering of benefit level with rising income;
it is administered and part-financed by local government councils, of which
there are several thousand in Hungary, that have little capability in this area
of work; and despite the fact that social assistance is now received by more
registered unemployed persons in Hungary than is UI, almost nothing is
known about its receipt.  The modelling of social assistance receipt is an
important part of the paper.
Our research is based on data from the UI register relating to an inflow
cohort of benefit recipients, coupled with data from a simple interview
survey of those cohort members who exhausted UI entitlement.  Section 2
introduces these data and provides the overall picture of what happens to3
persons who exhaust UI, together with their household circumstances.  The
operation of social assistance in Hungary is considered in Section 3 and a
simple model is estimated of both claims to and receipt of benefit, which is
built on in the rest of the paper. Section 4 investigates household living
standards (proxied by current income) following UI exhaustion in relation
to those while on UI and those on the return to work.  Section 5 analyses
the probability of leaving unemployment to get a job, focusing on the
effects of the social assistance system and using both parametric and non-
parametric methods.  Section 6 concludes.
2. UI REGISTER  DATA AND THE EXHAUSTER SURVEY
Our research is based on those individuals in the March and April 1994
inflow to the Hungarian UI register who had a continuous or near
continuous (43-47 months) employment history in the four years prior to
claim, resulting respectively in 12 and 11 months entitlement to UI.  This
cohort of 28,600 individuals made up two-thirds of the full inflow in the
two months concerned (the remaining one third had shorter employment
histories resulting in between 3 and 10 months of benefit entitlement).  Just
under a half of the cohort exhausted UI entitlement.  Financial restrictions
forced us to restrict our follow-up survey to a random sub-sample of
slightly more than a third of these exhausters.  Individuals were traced to
their home addresses and interviews were conducted with a total of 4,661
individuals, which represented a response rate of nearly 90 percent.
1  While
not as rich as the detailed household surveys of the unemployed that have
been used in some OECD countries (e.g. Narendranathan et al, 1984) the
follow-up survey greatly extends what can be said about living standards
and incentives based on UI register data alone.
Interviews were conducted 3 to 4 months after the date of UI
exhaustion.  Respondents were asked to report their labour market status in
each fortnight since the date of exhaustion, and additionally to report the
precise date that a job was first found (excluding casual work from this
definition).  The outcome of any claim to social assistance was recorded.
We also collected information on household composition and labour force
status of other members of the household together with the current
                                                
1 There were only a handful of refusals to the survey and the main reason for non-
response was inability to find sampled individuals even after a second visit; further
details are given in Micklewright and  Nagy [1996].  The sampling fractions of
claimants in the 11 and 12 month entitlement groups differed and we apply weights to
compensate for this in the descriptive analysis.4
earnings, if any, of the respondent and spouse.  Besides information on UI
previously paid and the past earnings used to determine those payments,
the UI register provided details of each claimant’s age, educational level,
and reason for entry to unemployment. (No information on household
characteristics is recorded in the UI register.)
Figure 2 shows the survivor functions for both the 11 and 12 month
entitlement groups in the inflow cohort.  Prior to the point of exhaustion we
are looking at survival in the UI register against the "risk" of exit for any
reason (e.g. job, training scheme, pension, disqualification).  Following
exhaustion we treat as remaining in the "base" state (and hence still at risk)
individuals who report in the period concerned that they were in any of the
categories (i) casual work (with or without job search), (ii) looked for a job
but could not find one, (iii) did not look for a job or were not able to work.
2
Spells of individuals exhausting UI entitlement but who were not included
in the follow-up survey are treated as censored at the point of exhaustion.
The survivor functions for both entitlement groups show a sharp dip
following exhaustion and in the case of the 12 month group there is similar
dip at the 6 month point, when eligibility for a variety of exits from UI
begins, notably early retirement.  Leaving aside these dips, the slopes of the
survivor functions appear reasonably similar before and after exhaustion,
suggesting that on average UI exhaustion is not associated with a major
change in behaviour.
Table 1  provides more detail on what happens immediately after UI
exhaustion and at the three month point.  The dips in the functions in
Figure  2  at the exhaustion points are reflected in the 6 percent of the
sample already in a job in the first fortnight and the 7 percent exiting to
receipt of pension or other benefit scheme and, in a few cases, labour
market programmes. At the three month point, 1 in 6 of the sample were in
employment, and of the remainder the great majority reported that they
were looking for a job, although the proportion not searching is notably
higher for women. This does not suggest substantial withdrawal from the
labour market, although the classification of labour market status in the
follow-up survey is less accurate than would be obtained with a genuine
labour force survey instrument.  The use of Employment Office clerks for
much of the interviewing may have biased upwards the number of
respondents reporting search.  For the same reason the amount of casual
work - reported by 10 percent of men - may be understated.
The household characteristics of the sample are summarised in Table 2.
                                                
2 The definition of the base state is designed to maximise comparability of pre- and
post-exhaustion status.  For example, UI recipients may or may not search and may or
may not undertake casual work.5
Much debate about income support for the unemployed in Central and
Eastern Europe ignores this issue, which corresponds to an implicit
assumption that the unemployed live alone, with neither dependants to
provide for nor other household members who can help support living
standards.  Table 2 shows that UI exhausters living alone are in a very
small minority – about 1 in 10 men and 1 in 25 women.  A third of all men
and well over a half of women have a working spouse, which represents a
half and three-quarters respectively of those that are married.  A half of
men and two-thirds of women live in a household where at least one person
works; the figure for both sexes together, 58 percent, is very similar to that
of 55 percent for all long-term ILO/OECD unemployed in Hungary in 1993
given by Förster [1996].
Table 3 shows that among the five Central European countries
considered by Förster, Hungary had with Slovakia the lowest proportion of
long-term unemployed living in households with an earner and – something
that may come as a surprise – a situation little different to that in several
Northern European countries, notably France and the Netherlands.  In the
other Central European countries, the presence of an earner is rather more
common than in Northern Europe but no more so than in Southern Europe
and, in two cases – Greece and Portugal – rather less common.
Income from work is the most important source of support from other
household members but if we include any form of income the proportion of
respondents in the follow-up survey living with another adult receiving
income is shown by Table 2 as being as much as three-quarters for both
sexes.  Of course, other adults generate costs for the household as well as
potential resources but this does not detract from their importance in
smoothing income changes at the point of UI exhaustion.  The same is true
of dependent children, present in the households of a half of men and two-
thirds of women.  Children raise household needs but also have an impact
on resources – an important feature of the cash transfer system in Hungary
is a relatively generous family allowance system which in 1995 paid
benefit to parents of all children of the relevant age.
3
  (Benefit levels under
neither UI nor the social assistance scheme are related to family
circumstances.)  The monthly family allowance for two children (the modal
number) in 1995 was almost exactly the same as the level of social
assistance for the unemployed – about 25 percent of the net average wage.
                                                
3 Income-testing for family allowance was introduced in 1996 but about two-thirds of
families continue to be eligible and the figure must be even higher for the unemployed
given their concentration at the bottom of the income distribution.6
3. THE PROBABILITY OF SOCIAL BENEFIT RECEIPT
Discussion of social assistance for the unemployed often assumes that
receipt following exhaustion of UI is automatic, implying that a UI scheme
with limited duration followed by possible assistance benefit can be
described as a system of „indefinite” benefit (Atkinson and Micklewright,
[1991]). This ignores the test of family or household income and assets that
is a condition for receipt of assistance benefits. And even when the
existence of that test is recognised, the standard assumption is that
entitlement is both claimed by the individual and accurately assessed by the
benefit agency. This section models the decision to claim and to award
social assistance in Hungary.
Social assistance for the unemployed in Hungary, known officially as
Social Benefit (SB), pays a flat-rate benefit equal, in 1995, to 6720 forints
per month (about $45).  This level is set to be equal to 80 percent of the
minimum old-age pension, and, as we shall see later, is well below the
level of most UI payments.  An application for benefit may only be made
after UI eligibility is exhausted and the claimant's household must have per
capita net income below the SB level in order to qualify.  There is no
tapering of the benefit level as income approaches this threshold, implying
that total household income (including SB) will fall when the threshold is
crossed.  This crudeness in the scheme is repeated in other features – there
are no additions for dependants and the per capita test of income makes no
allowance for economies of scale within the household.  Unlike UI, SB is
not subject to income tax.
SB is administered by local government councils. There are over 3000
of these, three-quarters covering areas with under two thousand inhabitants
(Bird et al, [1996]).  Co-funding by central government is intended to
provide required funds but maintain financial discipline: only half of
councils' expenditure on social benefit can be re-claimed from central
funds.
4  The smaller councils are ill-equipped to administer a major social
assistance scheme and their investigation of claims appears minimal.
Documentary evidence of household income reported by claimants is
required but in the local council areas we checked, home visits are rarely
made on the grounds that this would be intrusive.  Recipients must stay
registered as unemployed at local employment offices (requiring only a
                                                
4 In practice, councils also receive help from the state budget via the annual block grants
that form the majority of their resources and which are based on a variety of indicators
of demand for social welfare including the local unemployment rate.  However, such
assistance is not explicitly matched to social assistance demand and in any case is
retrospective.7
monthly visit in one area we visited and a quarterly visit in another) and the
councils are informed if registration lapses, but direct contact between the
SB recipient and the local council may be limited to the annual check of
income required by law.  This picture presents SB as "easy money" (as one
council official we spoke to labelled it). Against this, however, there is no official
application form and awards must be made formally at a meeting of elected
council members. This implies a rather public procedure, which may discourage
take-up.
Just under a half of all follow-up survey respondents reported receipt of
SB since exhausting UI - this is our estimate of the unconditional
probability of receiving SB following a spell of UI.  Receipt among those
still in the base state at interview is shown in Table 4. Nearly 60 percent
receive at this point and while receipt is a bit more common for men it is
not markedly so.  Those not reporting search are notably less likely to be in
receipt and casual workers have an even lower incidence of benefit.  We
suspect that this reflects some reluctance by those receiving benefit to
report casual work, although it is notable that the proportion of all SB
recipients reporting casual work (less than 5 percent) is very similar to that
in data from the Labour Force Survey (where interviewers were not from
employment offices).  On the other hand, casual work may in part be a
reaction to inability to qualify for benefit.  A quarter of this sub-sample
have never claimed SB, and about 1 in 7 claimed unsuccessfully (or in a
few cases were waiting to have a claim decided).
The simplest view of an income-tested benefit scheme has non-receipt
due solely to household income exceeding the threshold for benefit, with
some households realising this without having to make a claim.  In reality
the reasons for non-receipt are likely to be more varied, involving take-up
costs on the one hand and administration errors on the other (see, for
example, Blundell et al, [1988], and Duclos, [1995]).  The latter may be
accidental or even deliberate in the case where the agent administering the
scheme chooses to ignore the rules.  Given the nature of the Hungarian SB
scheme described above, these other factors may play a significant role.
The main reasons reported by the individuals in  Table 4  for not
applying for SB were varied, with excessive income cited in only a third of
cases.  Nearly 1 in 10 said that the procedure was too complicated.  More
than a quarter reported that they had not applied because they had expected
to find a job quickly.  This seems a curious response given that the
individuals concerned had already spent over a year unemployed.  If these
responses are truthful, then the re-employment probability may be seen as
affecting benefit status rather than causality running only in the opposite
direction.  Viewed another way, these answers may just indicate very high8
take up costs for the individuals concerned.
We model the information in Table 4 with two simple equations for the
probability of claim and of award:
p (claim)  = F ( E(SB), claiming costs)        (1)
p (award) = F (claimant income, council factors).            (2)
where E(SB) is the SB that the individual expects to receive conditional on
his or her circumstances.  This in turn is equal to the individual’s subjective
probability of an award, multiplied by the fixed SB level
.5   In an ideal
world, this perceived probability would be equal to unity when the
claimant’s per capita income is above the threshold and zero when below.
But reality may depart from this ideal for several reasons. Some households
may not know the rules of the scheme and apply despite their income being
too high to qualify, their expected SB being based on an incorrect
perception of the actual probability of an award.  But even households who
know the rules and see that their income is above the threshold may have a
positive expectation of benefit in excess of their claiming costs and may
hence apply, in the hope that local council administration is imperfect or
because they intend not to declare some of their income. Finally, as „take-
up analysts” ( Duclos, [1995]) our observation of income is undoubtedly
imperfect, so from a practical point of view we cannot base our calculations
of entitlement on observed income alone.
The actual probability of award, given by equation (2), is assumed to
depend on the council’s observation of the claimant’s income (which may
be imperfect) together with other factors that it may take into account in its
decision-making process or which have an impact on this.  We include
three variables.
(i) the local employment office area unemployment rate, which we
hypothesise to have a positive impact due to increased council generosity
towards their electors in areas where job prospects are poor;
6
                                                
5
 The theoretical model underlying equation (1) assumes that risk-neutral individuals
base claim behaviour on a comparison of an uncertain income in the event of a claim
(incomes net of claiming costs in the award and no-award outcomes weighted by their
respective perceived probabilities) and a certain income if no claim is made.
Entitlement to SB, where it exists, is to a fixed flat-rate sum; since it displays no
individual variation it can play no part in the empirical modelling, in contrast to the
take-up models of Blundell et al [1988] and Duclos [1995].
6 An alternative view, suggested to us by a local council office, is that in areas of high
unemployment there is a high demand for various other forms of social assistance, which, in
contrast to SB, are funded wholly from councils' own resources with no direct cost-sharing9
(ii) total income assessable for Personal Income Tax (PIT) per head of
population in the claimant's council area in 1994, which we use as a proxy
for ability to fund SB and hence of willingness to make awards;
7
(iii) the local council area population.  Our hypothesis is that smaller
councils are less able or willing to investigate claims and thus in these areas
benefit is more likely to be awarded.
If the SB system functions according to the rules for entitlement laid
down in the relevant legislation then we should find that none of these three
variables has a significant impact, conditional on observed claimant
income. If they are significant then this suggests an element of discretion in
the scheme that should not be present.
Although the subjective and actual probabilities of award may differ,
potential claimants may have some awareness of their local council's policy
on awards or their efficiency in determining claims that helps form their
own perceptions of the award probability.  Some variables in the award
equation should thus be included in the claim equation.  Some of these
variables may also affect claiming costs.  Increased income may raise the
stigma attached to receipt of means-tested benefit as well as lowering the
perceived probability of award. Higher unemployment may lower the
disutility of claiming since expected duration on benefit will be longer
.8
We enter other variables assumed to have a direct impact on claiming costs
and no impact on E(SB), notably education and the level of the individual’s
previous UI benefit which we expect to have a similar impact on stigma to
other household income.
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated together as a bivariate probit
model
.9
  Results are given in Table 5 for men and women separately and
                                                                                                                                              
with central government.  In this situation there is an incentive for councils to use the SB
scheme for the unemployed. On this view SB may represent "easy money" for councils as
well as claimants.
7 A proportion (35 percent in 1995) of PIT revenue is returned to the council area of
derivation and although these funds represent only about 10 percent of total local
council revenue nationally (Bird et al, [1996]) the council area taxable personal
income should proxy a number of other sources, including property taxes.  (Direct
transfers from central government are equalising but do not remove differences.)
8 In other words, the average monthly claiming cost falls as unemployment rises.
9 Let the propensity to claim and to be awarded benefit be given by Y 1 and Y 2
respectively with corresponding binary variables D1 and D2 indicating an observed
claim and award, where:
Y1 =  b b1X1 + e1
Y2 =  b b2X2 + e210
the estimated impacts of unemployment and income for the former are
graphed in Figure 3. The estimated correlation between the errors in the
two equations is insignificant for both sexes, but it should be noted that the
apparent self-selection effect is rather sensitive to the specification of the
equations.
We start with the impact of household income.
10  Although strongly
significant in both equations, household income appears to affect awards
more than claims, which may imply that administration errors or laxity in
adjudicating claims are less important than ignorance of the rules or other
influences that weaken the influence of income on claim behaviour.  Figure
3 shows that moving from the bottom to the top of the per capita income
distribution reduces the award probability for a man by about 0.6 and the
claim probability by about 0.35. The estimated effects for women are
somewhat larger, especially for claims.
The hypothesis of no local effects in the determination of awards is
rejected, although the results are mixed.  In particular, the unemployment
rate has a significant, although not particularly well-determined, positive
impact for both sexes (well beyond its possible effect on local wage rates
and hence any unobserved household income).  Figure 3 shows that the
range of observed unemployment rates in the 170 employment office areas
in the data is associated with a ceteris paribus difference in the probability
of receiving an award of about 0.25.  On the other hand, the council area
taxable income is completely insignificant for both sexes and this is an
important - and encouraging - result to have established: there is no
evidence that poorer councils are less disposed to make SB awards, given
observed claimant income.  Council area population, however, has a
positive impact for men.  A 10 percent rise in population is estimated to
                                                                                                                                              
We observe:  D1 = 1 if Y1 > 0 (D1 = 0 otherwise)
 D2 = 1 if Y2 > 0 and Y1 > 0
 D2 = 0 if Y2 £ 0 and Y1 > 0 (D2 is not observed if Y1 £ 0).
We assume that e1 and e2 follow a bivariate normal distribution with means zero,
variances unity, and correlation coefficient r.  The log-likelihood of the observed
data is maximised with respect to b b1, b b2, and r.
10 Income is only partially observed within the survey and we undertook some
imputation to arrive at a total for the household.  We observe the net earnings of
spouses but not of other household members, for whom we know only the
employment status. We imputed earnings for the latter from regressions run on the
former.  Family allowances were imputed following the rules in force at the time of
the survey. Pensions and other social security benefit income were imputed from
regressions run on the T ÁRKI Hungarian household panel (we observe their
presence in the follow-up survey but not the amount received).11
increase the award probability by about 1 percent – there is no evidence
that smaller councils are more lax and thus more generous. The result could
obviously be interpreted in the opposite way – that smaller councils are
tougher – but this is not the only possible interpretation. Moreover, the
result is not found for women, which complicates the interpretation for
men, and in the larger cities there is a mixture of estimated impacts.
The impact of local unemployment on claims is larger and notably
better determined than its impact on awards - a lower disutility of claims
re-enforcing any effect coming through the perceived probability of
awards.  A number of other variables have big effects on claims,
conditional on household income.  For example, women with less than
primary education have a probability of claiming that is up to 40 percent
points higher than women with primary education; claims are somewhat
more likely from single than from married women.  In both cases our
interpretation is that claiming costs are lower for the individuals concerned.
The previous level of UI benefit (which of course is not taken into account
in the SB income test) has no discernible impact on the claim probability
for men but an important and well determined negative impact for women,
not much less that that for household income.  Our interpretation is that
stigma from claiming rises with UI level although it is difficult to think
why this should be the case only for women.
These results provide some insight into the operation of social
assistance in Hungary, showing that the probability of receipt is influenced
by several important factors other than income level, and thus providing a
richer view of the operation of such schemes.   They also enable us to
predict receipt for all the follow-up survey sample and we build on this in
the rest of the paper.
4. LIVING STANDARDS FOLLOWING EXHAUSTION
The living standards of the unemployed can be measured in a number of
ways.  An obvious possibility is to assess income or expenditure in relation
to an absolute poverty line, as in the recent assessment of poverty in
Hungary by the  World Bank  [1996].  The authors adopt as a poverty
threshold the minimum pension level, which, it is argued, is sufficiently
low to identify „the very poorest individuals” (p.16).  This is well above the
SB level and the setting of the latter below the minimum pension reflects a
concern with costs and incentives as opposed to a purely social objective in
which the greater subsistence needs of an active person would require that12
SB were the higher of the two.
11
Measuring living standards by equivalised annual expenditure, 5
percent of all households in the 1993 Hungarian Budget Survey were found
to be beneath the minimum pension level (World Bank, [1996], Table 1.7).
However, the incidence of poverty, on this yardstick, in households with an
unemployed head was about 15 percent if some form of unemployment
benefit was received and as high as 40 percent if there were no benefits.
On the other hand, in households containing an unemployed person but
where the head was employed, poverty rates were only 5 and 15 percent
respectively.  These results show the generally disadvantaged position of
many unemployed, particularly those without benefits, but also
demonstrate that living standards will vary notably with the labour force
status of other household members.
Our concern in this paper is less with the absolute level of living
standards of the unemployed than with how these change at exhaustion of
UI or on return to work.  There may be smoothing of consumption across
these events but we cannot observe this with the available data and instead
proxy changes in living standards by changes in monthly income.  We
therefore consider various ratios of incomes in the different states:
i) Social Benefit / last net UI payment;
ii) net household income following exhaustion / net household income
when individual last received UI;
iii) Social Benefit / net wage on return to work;
iv) net household income following exhaustion / total net income on return
to work.
Ratios (i) and (ii) are backward looking replacement rates, measuring
change in income following UI exhaustion; (iii) and (iv) show how income
changes on the return to work; (i) and (iii) focus only on the individual’s
benefits and wages while (ii) and (iv) include other sources of household
income.
Tables 6 and 7 give descriptive statistics on these ratios. Table 6 is
restricted to those in the "base state" at interview (still unemployed) and
shows that, when received, SB replaces on average two-thirds of UI for
men and three-quarters for women, implying a substantial drop in benefit
income.  In 10 percent of cases there is a fall of less than 20 percent while
in another 10 percent of cases benefit income falls by a half.  The bottom
part of the table shows how the picture is modified when we take into
                                                
11   The same balance of considerations may also be seen in the design of social
assistance for the unemployed in the UK (Atkinson and Micklewright, [1992], chapter
8).13
account other household income.  Where SB is not received, household
income is on average around 60 percent of that when UI was paid
(somewhat lower for men and higher for women).   Other sources of
income are thus playing an important role in supporting living standards
after UI exhaustion. The same is true where SB is in receipt: the mean ratio
of household incomes before and after exhaustion is over 80 percent for
men and nearly 90 percent for women.  The figures vary substantially with
household circumstances. For example, when no SB is received a woman
whose husband does not work faces an average income drop of 50 percent
compared to 25 percent for women with employed husbands.  Replacement
rates are some 5 to 10 percentage points higher where there are dependent
children, emphasising the role of family allowances in cushioning income
changes resulting from the unemployment benefit system (although the
data may also reflect other differences between households with and
without children).
Table 7 shows actual income gains on return to work for those back in a
job at interview. On average the net wage in the new job for men is just
over double the income from SB where previously received (or predicted
from the award equation in  Table 5 where the return to work happened
quickly).  Even at the bottom decile of new job wages, the return to work
leads to a 50 percent rise in income.  Not surprisingly the changes for
women are smaller with a mean benefit/wage ratio of 58 percent compared
to 46 percent for men.
12
The lower half of the table again shows how the picture is modified
by taking into account income of other household members. On average,
the net household income of men returning to work who previously
received SB rises by only 50 percent compared to the average change of
100 percent when one focuses on benefits and wages alone.  For women,
the average rise in household income is only one third. It is also striking
that the changes in household income are on average not so very different
for those with or without previous SB (or predicted SB). The mean values
of the income ratio for men in the two groups only differ by 6 percent
points, which may be compared with the 25 point difference in mean values
of the household income ratio in  Table 6.  The implication is that those
without SB are on average returning to lower wage jobs than those who
receive (or would have received) the benefit.  This is consistent with the
absence of SB leading to lower reservation wages but there may of course
                                                
12  The wages that the individuals return to are low. The means for both sexes are only
60 percent of those for employed persons in the March 1995 sweep of TARKI
household panel and in almost 90 percent of cases the re-employment wages in the
follow-up survey are in the bottom half of the distribution in the TARKI data.14
be other differences between the two groups that explain the patterns in the
data.  The presence of a working spouse is again associated with higher
income ratios.  On average, a woman returning to work raises household
income by 50 percent where no SB was paid (or predicted) but by only 30
percent if she previously received SB.
Household circumstances clearly do affect the changes in income (and,
by proxy, living standards) that occur on exhaustion of UI and on the return
to work. Neither transition leads to such large changes in living standards
as one might expect from a focus on benefits and wages alone. The
household cushions the impact of ending UI entitlement and also reduces
the impact of the return to work.  The former is beneficial from the point of
view of income support for the unemployed.  The latter may decrease the
incentive to find new work.  In the next section we try to deduce the impact
on individual behaviour of these changes in household income.
The importance of the household in reducing relative income changes
should not be confused with its impact on the  absolute level of living
standards of the unemployed. While other household members could
reduce the probability of being below a poverty threshold, for example
where they are employed, they could also increase it. For example, children
may "bring" family allowance to the household but overall their presence
may typically reduce total equivalised income. Although family allowance
dampens down income changes following benefit and labour market
transitions, a household may still be worse-off in absolute terms as the
result of its children.
5. INCENTIVES TO RETURN TO WORK
We start by seeing how the behaviour of the job exit hazard changes around
the UI exhaustion point, distinguishing between those with low and high
probabilities of getting SB.  This is shown in Figure 4, where hazards in
terms of days until exhaustion are estimated non-parametrically using one-
week intervals.  Estimation uses the full inflow cohort from which the
exhauster survey was drawn, conditional on survival in the UI register to
within four months of the point of exhaustion.  All spells ending in exits to
states other than a job are treated as censored at the point of exit.
Figure 4  is restricted to those in the top and bottom thirds of the
distribution of predicted probabilities of SB entitlement.  These predicted
probabilities are based on a simple probit that is estimated for those in the
follow-up survey who at interview were either (i) receiving SB, or (ii)
reported claiming but being refused benefit due to the level of household15
income or not claiming at all on grounds of income level. In this way we
try to restrict the estimation sample to those cases where entitlement
definitely existed or where it appears not to have done so.  In order to
inspect the hazards before as well as after the exhaustion point, the model
is estimated only with variables available from the UI register or which
refer to the local area – variables that are available for the whole inflow
cohort rather than just for the follow-up survey sample.
13  It is tempting to
compare directly the levels of the hazards for those with high and low
predicted SB probabilities but this would not be a comparison that held
other things equal.  It is the comparison of the changes in the hazards that
is more appropriate.  Does the low SB probability group experience a larger
change in the hazard around the exhaustion point than the high probability
group?
In the case of the men, the hazard for the group with low SB probability
almost doubles in the last week of UI entitlement, having only risen slightly
in the previous four months.  This is nothing compared to the jump in the
hazard in the next week, the first following exhaustion of UI, when there is
a six-fold increase over the average value in the 6 weeks prior to
exhaustion (leaving out the last week from this calculation).
14
 But the high
SB probability group has an even bigger surge in the hazard following
exhaustion of UI, experiencing an eight-fold increase between the same
two periods.  The huge rises in the hazard last for just one week – the
hazard in the subsequent three weeks for the low probability group is
similar to that in the last week of UI, namely higher than earlier, and
thereafter oscillates around a level similar to that in the months preceding
exhaustion.
15
  The hazard also falls back sharply for the high SB
probability group, which appears from then on to have a somewhat higher
hazard compared to the pre-exhaustion period, although there is not much
in it. The pattern of results for women is similar to that for men.  The spike
in the hazard for both the low and high SB probability groups in the first
week following exhaustion is five times larger than that in the six weeks
                                                
13Although this model of "entitlement" reflects determinants of claim as well as award it
tries to restrict the former to cases where E(SB) is perceived to be low on account of
the level of household income. A model that included all non-recipients would
produce predictions that reflected in addition the impact of claiming costs, which we
certainly would not want for the purpose in hand.
14  The rise in the hazard is statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence interval
for the hazard in the last week of UI is from 0.0033 to 0.0058; that in the following
week is from 0.0104 to 0.0174.
15  The greater variability of the hazard following exhaustion is due to the smaller sample
from this point, the follow-up survey not covering all exhausters in the cohort.16
preceding exhaustion (excluding the last week). Compared to a base level
in earlier months, the rise for the low probability group is however
somewhat larger.
The evidence in Figure 4 does not suggest that job search behaviour
around the time of UI exhaustion is strongly related to the probability of
entitlement to SB.   There certainly does appear to be a group of persons
who time their return to work to coincide with the point of UI exhaustion,
but this behaviour does not appear to be very different for those with high
and low probabilities of SB.  Further investigation failed to reveal any
distinguishing feature of this group in terms of observable characteristics,
including level of UI payment or new job wages. It is also important to
keep the size of the group in perspective.  If we take all job exits right from
the start of UI receipt up until the follow-up survey date (weighting the
post-exhaustion exits to take account of the sampling from that point), the
"first week post-UI" exits account for only 8 percent of the total.
We now investigate the impact of SB more closely with the aid of a
parametric model of duration in the "base state" following UI exhaustion.
The job exit hazard is specified as a logit function of (i) observable
characteristics and (ii) time in the state, with all exits to states other than
employment treated as censored.  Parameters are estimated from a discrete-
time model of weeks in the base state, following the procedure outlined in
Jenkins [1995].  In estimating this model we condition on survival  beyond
the first week following exhaustion of UI.  This means that we do not
attempt to model the determinants of the big spikes in  Figure 4 . Our
conclusion is that unobserved heterogeneity is generating this phenomenon
and the easiest way to deal with it is to condition on survival past the risk
of exit at this point.
The financial incentives to leave unemployment for work are captured
by variables representing E(SB), the mean of the wage offer distribution,
and other household income.  In the six weeks following exhaustion, E(SB)
is taken as the probability of an award predicted from the award equation
results in Table 5 multiplied by the SB level (6720 forints); following the
six week point the variable is set to the SB level if the data collected at
interview show that an award was actually made and to zero otherwise.
Local councils awarding SB meet monthly and we assume that it takes six
weeks for the process of claim and award to work through.
16  (We noted
earlier that the individual's subjective probability of an award might well
differ from the actual probability but we are unable to identify the former.)
                                                
16  Among those still unemployed after six weeks, 62 percent of those who do not get a
job by the date of interview receive SB at some time and 33 percent of those who do
find work.17
The mean of the wage offer distribution is approximated by the fitted
values of a regression run on new job wages for those exiting to
employment, in which explanatory variables include the previous earnings
on which UI was based and a number of personal characteristics. The other
household income variable contains the same items as entered the
calculations of income ratios in Tables 6 and 7.  Controls are included for
age, education, marital status, circumstances of entering unemployment,
and the strength of the local labour market. The base-line hazard is
modelled by a series of dummy variables for each week until week 20.
Results are given separately for men and women in  Table 8  (the
coefficients of the base-line dummies are not reported). The first two
columns give the results of a specification including the controls only.
These differ notably between the sexes. Age has a strong and well
determined negative effect for men, a 10 percent increase in age leading to
a fall in the hazard of about 8 percent.
17  But there is no discernible impact
for women.  Nor is marital status associated with any increased probability
of finding a job for women while a married man is estimated to have a
hazard 1.5 times that of a single man. Increased education has an important
positive effect for both sexes.  The hazards are lower where there is a
higher rate of the local unemployment rate, although the effect is neither
very well determined nor large.
The second column for each sex includes the three income variables
described above. The coefficients on the SB variable and the predicted
wage have the signs one would expect and are significant, that on the
former being particularly well determined for both sexes.  Other household
income, on the other hand, is completely insignificant.  This result is
surprising and the apparent implication is that individuals base behaviour
on benefit and wages only, as in the simplest search model. Of course,
other household income affects the probability of receiving SB, hence
influencing the hazard indirectly, and the correlation between any SB
variable and other household income hinders the identification of their
separate impacts. We experi-mented with various specifications of the
benefit and wage variables.  For example, we removed the switch in the
value of the E(SB) after 6 weeks, making it equal throughout to the
predicted probability of award multiplied by the SB level, dropping at the
same time the other household income variable; the estimated coefficients
were very similar (although the standard errors doubled).  It may also be
                                                
17 With the logit functional form for the hazard, h, elasticities are given by (1-h)b for
variables in logs and (1-h)bx if in levels. In our calculations in the text we take h as
very small and the mean value of x.18
noted that the inclusion of the income variables changes the estimated
impact of some of the control variables, notably the impact of the local
unemployment rate, which changes sign.  The apparent implication is that
the negative impact on the hazard of higher local unemployment in the
model with no income variables reflects only an indirect effect through an
increased probability of an SB award, although it may be that we are
simply unable to identify the different effects adequately.
The elasticity for the hazard with respect to E(SB) implied by the
results in Table 8 is about -0.7 for both sexes, which represents a rather
modest impact and one not out of line with that found in some OECD
countries (for example, Narendranathan et al, [1985]).  It is also seems in
line with our non-parametric results, which showed that UI exhaustion has
a big impact on the hazard for certain individuals but did not suggest that
this has much to do with the probability of going on to receive SB.  Finally,
it echoes the low elasticities suggested by earlier work that looked at the
impact of a change in UI rules on the behaviour of UI recipients
(Micklewright and Nagy, [1995]).
6. CONCLUSIONS
Running out of entitlement is the most common way of leaving the UI
register in Hungary.  Our analysis of a follow-up survey of UI exhausters
has shed light on what happens next and hence on a number of aspects of
living standards of the unemployed, labour market flows and the design of
policy, all of which may have relevance for other countries in the region:
•  Means-tested social assistance benefit provides income support to about
a half of all exhausters in Hungary.  A model of claims by individuals
and awards by local councils suggests that claiming costs may be
important and that there is some variation in councils' treatment of
claims that is unrelated to claimants' income levels.  Further
investigations of this type are needed in transition economies given a
region-wide move to increased decentralisation of social protection
policy.  A positive finding in the Hungarian case is the absence of any
association of the award probability with the local council resource base;
the less well-off local councils do not appear to be ignoring the national
rules.
 
•  The impact of UI exhaustion on living standards (as proxied by income)
depends notably on the household circumstances of the individual, which19
have often been ignored in analysis of the unemployed in transition
economies.  The presence of other earners is a key issue here and we
showed how Hungary compares in this respect with a range of other
European countries.  A half of the married men in our sample had a
spouse who did not work but only a quarter of the married women; a half
of all the men and two-thirds of the women had dependent children.
 
•  One group of claimants appears to be timing the return to work to
coincide with the exhaustion of UI entitlement.  Changes in UI duration
or benefit levels would be a very crude tool with which to change
incentives for this group and a more appropriate policy response would
be to try to identify these claimants early on in their UI spells and
administer their claims in such a way as to pressurise them into earlier
exits.
 
•  The speed of return to work both before and after UI exhaustion does not
appear to be very strongly related to the probability of entitlement to
social assistance - the bulk of the Hungarian unemployed appear rather
inelastic to changes in benefits. The reasons for this are a matter for
interpretation.  On one argument it may be due to the existence of
opportunities for working in the black economy while receiving support
from the state.  A more charitable explanation would centre on the
individuals' lack of command over full-time job offers paying a living
wage.2021
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TABLES
Table 1.  Activity of UI Exhausters 1 Week and 3 Months after Exhaustion













  Base state:
Searching for a job 70.5 68.3 69.4 54.1 54.9 54.5
Not searching for a job 7.6 14.0 10.8 6.7 13.3 10.0
Casual work + search 8.7 3.2 6.0 8.2 2.4 5.3
Casual work, no search 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.9
  Exits:
Employment 7.0 5.7 6.4 20.9 16.8 18.8
Training / Public
works
0.5 0.5 0.5 2.3 1.2 0.8
Child care / Pension 4.0 6.6 5.3 5.8 9.3 7.6
Other 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note:  Percentages are based on weighted data.





Living alone 11.3 4.0
Single 31.2 22.1
Married, spouse works 34.1  57.9
Married, spouse does not work 34.7  19.0
Other working adult, not including spouse 19.3  16.0
Any working adult, including spouse 47.5  67.6
Any adult in household with income 74.9 78.0
Dependent child  47.9  68.3
 Average household size 3.2  3.4
Note:  Percentages are based on weighted data.24
Table 3.  Percent of long-term unemployed living



















Note:  Data for 1993/94 from Labour Force
Surveys (Förster, [1996])















SB in receipt 61.1 56.9 62.3 41.9 26.6 59.0
Received earlier 2.8 1.9 2.1 3.9 3.4 2.4
Unsuccessful claim 12.4 15.6 13.7 15.6 19.5 14.0
Has not claimed 23.8 25.5 22.0 38.6 50.6 24.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: The "base" state are the first four rows in Table 1.  Percentages based on weighted data.25
Table 5.  Bivariate Probit Model of SB Claim and Receipt
Men Women
Claim Award Claim Award
Constant  -0.176  -0.025  1.825  1.505
  (0.7)   (0.05)   (6.7)   (3.8)
Income per capita (000s Forints) -0.068 -0.144 -0.099 -0.175
  (6.2)   (5.7)   (8.7)  (9.7)




Incomplete primary education 0.396 0.952
(2.2) (3.0)
Vocational school -0.190 -0.166
(2.2) (1.8)
Vocational secondary school -0.319 -0.393
(2.3) (3.5)
General secondary school -0.414 -0.228
(2.2) (1.8)




Local unemployment rate (%)  0.103  0.069  0.064  0.040
  (9.7)   (2.6)   (5.5)   (2.4)
Budapest dummy  0.510  0.318  0.315  0.488
  (3.7)   (1.1)   (2.5)   (1.9)
Other big city dummy -0.497 -0.218
(2.3) (1.0)
Population of local council area (log) 0.124 -0.025
(2.6) (0.5)
Taxable personal income in local council





Error correlation (r) -0.165 -0.132
(0.3) (0.5)
Log-likelihood -1228.63 -1254.09
Sample size  1546  1525
Number of claimants 1135  1105
Number of recipients   944  867
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. The sample used in estimation is those individuals who at
interview are in casual work, searching for a job, or who are inactive.26
Table 6.  Income changes on exhausting UI
Men Women
No SB SB no SB SB
SB/UI %
Bottom Decile  47.6 54.5
Top Decile  83.1 84.4
Mean 68.3 77.7
Ratio of post- to pre-exhaustion household
income, %
Mean:
All individuals 57.5 82.2 66.1 89.0
Married, spouse not working 52.0 81.8 48.8 87.2
Married, spouse working 67.0 86.4 73.0 92.9
No dependent children 53.9 80.1 62.1 84.3
Dependent children 63.0 84.8 68.6 91.0
Sample size 602 944 658 867
Note: Percentages are based on weighted data.
Table 7.  Income changes on return to work
Men Women
No SB SB no SB SB
SB/Wage %
Bottom Decile 39.1 37.2
Top Decile 64.0 69.7
Mean 46.3 57.7
Ratio of post-exhaustion household income
to that on return to work, %
Mean:
All individuals 61.2 67.4 67.3 75.0
Married, spouse not working 68.6 68.1 65.9 75.8
Married, spouse working 58.8 73.7 67.3 83.7
No dependent children 62.1 62.7 65.3 69.3
Dependent children 60.1 70.4 68.6 77.9
Sample size 188 324 206 213
Notes: Percentages are based on weighted data. We included among SB recipients those who
returned to work quickly after exhaustion who did not receive SB but who had a high
predicted probability of SB award (using the award equation in Table 5).27
Table 8.  Discrete-time duration model of the post-UI exhaustion job exit
hazard (logit functional form)
Controls only Full model





















































































Log-likelihood -2539.40 -2099.31 -2502.78 -2066.01
Number of spells 2195 2050 2195 2050
Number of job exits 517 407 517 407
Notes: The likelihood is conditioned on survival past the first week after exhausting UI.
T-statistics are given in parenthesis.  Expected SB, the predicted wage and other
household income are in thousands of forints per month.  Expected SB varies with
duration in the manner described in the text.  All models include weekly dummy
variables for the base-line hazard.2829
FIGURES
Figure 1.  Monthly outflow rates and re-employment rates from the
Unemployment Insurance Register in Hungary (quarterly
averages)
Source: National Labour Centre
Note:  Outflow rates are calculated as percentage of stock of benefit recipients
a) leaving for any reason including UI exhaustion b) leaving to a job30


























Figure 3.  Estimated impacts of per capita household
income and local unemployment rate on the
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Note: Based on results in  Table 5  for individuals with assumed
characteristics: primary school education, single, continuous
variables set at their average values32
Figure 4. Pre- and post exhaustion re-employment hazards by the predicted




























Note: High and low SB probabilities refer to the top and bottom thirds of the
distributions predicted by probits of receipt estimated for the sub-
sample described in the text using variables from the UI register only
(pre-unemployment earnings, age, educational level, local unemp-
loyment rate, population of local council area, per capita taxable
personal income in local council area)